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Resumen: Se pretende responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿el incremento en el con-
sumo de bienes durables –como los electrodom´ esticos– ayud´ o a que el
partido en el poder mantuviese la presidencia de M´ exico en el 2006?
Dicho de otra manera, ¿la clase media vot´ o a favor del actual modelo
econ´ omico? Limitaciones en los datos forzaron a contestar estas pre-
guntas de manera indirecta estableciendo correlaciones y no causalida-
des, con los respectivos problemas de identiﬁcaci´ on. Sin embargo, esta
investigaci´ on no pudo rechazar la hip´ otesis aludida. En una elecci´ on
cerrada, un peque˜ no efecto puede hacer la diferencia, y este an´ alisis
sugiere que eso ocurri´ o.
Abstract: The present paper tries to answer the following question: did an in-
crease in the consumption of durable goods -such as electric appliances-
help the incumbent party to retain the Mexican presidency in 2006?
Stated diﬀerently, did the middle class vote to support the current
economic model? Important data limitations made the use of indirect
tests and correlations necessary, rather than causalities -with the as-
sociated identiﬁcation problems. Nonetheless, the paper was not able
to reject the hypothesis mentioned above. In a tight election, a small
eﬀect could make the diﬀerence; and this analysis suggests that this is
likely what happened.
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1. Introducti on
In July 2006, Mexicans voted for a new President in the tightest
national election ever. The strongest candidates came from the PRD
(Democratic Revolution Party), considered as a center-left party with
1 some proclivity to state intervention in economic issues; the PAN
(National Action Party), considered a center-right party and typi-
2 cally pro-market; and the PRI(Institutional Revolutionary Party),
3 considered ambiguous in ideological terms but typi¯ed as centrist.
As background, the PRIruled Mexico for 72 uninterrupted years.
It was not until the election of 2000 when the PAN legally and peace-
4 fully overthrew it, accomplishing its ¯rst Presidential period from
December 1st, 2000 to November 30th, 2006. As for the PRD,a l -
though it has never been in command of the Federal Executive Ad-
ministration, it has been in control of Mexico City's Executive Ad-
ministration for the last twelve years.
For the ¯rst time ever, during the election of 2006, the two par-
ties once considered as the opposition ended up in ¯rst and second
place, leaving the PRI 's candidate far behind in third place. In Febru-
ary 2006, when the campaigns started o±cially, the advantage of the
PRD's candidate over the PAN's candidate was around nine points; by
late June 2006 {the month before the election{ the gap was reduced
to three points (Mitofsky, June 2006) or in a technical draw according
to some national electoral surveys (Moreno, Mancillas and Gutierrez,
2006). The winner of the presidential election, after some political
and legal struggles, was the PAN's candidate but by less than 1% of
5 the votes; slightly more than the ones received by the PRD's. The
o±cial ¯gures gave 35.89% of the votes to the former and 35.33% to
6 the latter; the PRIgot only 22.23%. With this change of preferences
from supporting the PRD at the beginning of campaign to supporting
1 A ctual l y,i t cam e f rom a coal i ti on nam ed Co a l i c i ¶ on por elbi en de todos,an
a llia n ce b etw een th e PT (Labor Party) and Conver genci a, w hi ch are pol i ti cal l y
s ma l l e rt ha nt hePRD.Hi sna mei sAndr ¶ es M anuelL¶ op ez O brador.
2 Hi sna mei sFe l i peCa l de r ¶ on H i noj osa.
3 A s w ell, it ca m e fro m a co a litio n n a m ed Al i a nz a p o rM¶ exico,wh i c h a l s o
i ncl uded the PVEM (M ex ica n G reen E co lo g ist P a rty ), w h ich is p o litica lly sm a ller
than the PRI . H is n a m e is R o b erto M a d ra zo P in ta d o .
4 In co a litio n w ith th e PVEM . B ut, in Septem b er 2001, it ended the coalition.
5 ThePRD's candidate, to date,has not recognized the o± cialresults of the
P residentialE lection.
6 FederalE lectoralInstitute's (IF E ) o± ci aldatabaseDO WALMARTI ANSRULE? 91
the PAN on Election Day, a question emerges: did an economic ra-
tionale play a role in the ¯nal election results or was it just political
strategies?
While the PRD candidate's platform represented more drastic
changes in terms of the current economic model, the PAN candidate's
was based on modi¯cations of the existing one. The support of the
principal candidates was clearly divided according to two variables:
geographical zone and income group. The northern and western parts
ofthe country solidly supported the PAN's candidate, while the central
and southern parts of the country supported the PRD's. In terms
of income groups, the latter's main support came from the lower
income people {not surprising since the campaign's motto was \The
poor ones ¯rst"{ while support for the former came largely from the
upper income groups (Mitofsky, July 2006; Institute ofMarketing and
Opinion, 2006).
There is a popular notion among economists that establishes that
stable macroeconomic conditions enhance welfare. The rationale be-
hind is that stability enables better planning, the existence of long-
term ¯nancial contracts, and a larger credit supply. The availability of
credit, together with the liberalization oftrade, allows more consump-
tion of a series of goods (including many durable goods) by middle-
income groups. Recently, an article published by The Economist con-
cluded very similarly: \Faster growth, low in°ation, expanding credit,
and liberal trade are helping to create a new middle class in Latin
America..." (The Economist, 2007). These ideas produced some echo
in the media. For example, less than one month before the election,
an editorial from The Wall Street Journal (WS J ) suggested that the
election could be de¯ned by people who buy durable goods in Wal-
Mart (Lyons, 2006); the title of this paper is derived from it. The
central thesis of the WS Janalysis was that PRD's proposal could be
attractive to the middle class voters because of the low growth rates
of the Mexican economy and of its inherent inequality; but, on the
other hand, that the PAN's model could also be preferred because of
7 the possibility of avoiding other crises. So, both a more egalitarian
distribution and stability are attractive features to middle class vot-
ers and political parties may tend to direct their platforms to them
(Dixit and Londregan, 1998).
This study intends to test the aforementioned hypotheses, ex-
pressed as follows: was the middle class a decisive element in the
7 T he transition from the PRIA dm inistration to P A N A dm inistration in 2000
w a s th e ¯ rst p resid en tia l tra n sitio n th a t d id n o t en d in a n eco n o m ic crisis sin ce
the 1970s.¶ 92 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
Presidential election in Mexico by preferring \stability" rather than
\change"? The quest is twofold: ¯rst, a de¯nition of who composes
the relevant middle class is needed; and later, an evaluation of their
role in the election. The paper is organized in the following way: Sec-
t i o n2s k e t c h e sb r i e ° yt h ec o n c e p to fm i d d l ec l a s sa n di t sd y n a m i c s ;
in section 3, a discussion of the ideal data set and the available one
is presented, with emphasis on the identi¯cation of e®ects; section 4
includes the econometric speci¯cations and their interpretation; and
¯nally, section 5 brie°y concludes.
2 .Co nc e pt ua lF r a me wo r k
Who is the middle class? While a ¯rst approach at the question may
hint at a trivial answer, a deeper analysis should provide a series
of complex elements encompassed in the de¯nition. When it is em-
ployed to refer to middle-income groups, then it is straightforward
and statistical in nature (that is, the middle class would be an inter-
val around the median of the income distribution). Obviously, some
technical problems emerge: the use ofper capita or household income,
the need for adjusting income by equivalent scales, the consideration
of purchasing power at speci¯c localities, among others. Nonetheless,
if these kinds of problems are not completely solved, at least they are
very well understood (Deaton, 1997).
The de¯nition that is typically used for middle class is more
subjective in nature and refers to the achievement of certain living
standards. It may be linked to speci¯c behaviors or capacities, like
having di®erent types ofcapital (social, economical, or cultural), spe-
ci¯c patterns of eating, or by practicing varieties of leisure activities
(Tomlinson, 2003). The de¯nition may also vary through time: while
only the rich could own a car at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury in the developed countries, ¯fty years later it was a middle class
characteristic in the same nations. It may also be linked to speci¯c
geographic areas or countries. So, an interesting question is, do the
m i d d l e - i n c o m eg r o u p sc o n s t i t u t et h em i d d l ec l a s s ?b e c a u s ei nL a t i n
America this is not normally the case: \[in Latin America] middle-
income households are not middle class at all; they are actually rather
poor..." (Birdsall, 2002).
Given the di±culties of identifying the middle class, it is not
surprising that few papers have been written discussing the e®ects of
structural reforms in Latin America during the 90s on that group.
To some extent, the root of the problem in the de¯nition, as arguedDO WALMARTI ANSRULE? 93
above, is that middle class should be associated with welfare levels in-
stead of income. Hence, the statistical income measure of the middle
class families is not accurate enough, especially in Latin America. In
addition, while a fair amount of studies consider the e®ects of the re-
forms in the region on both poverty and inequality, welfare dynamics
remain considerably obscure (Birdsall, 2002; Lora and Panizza, 2002;
Villarreal, 2006). E®orts to link the change in the economic model
that occurred in Latin America with electoral outcomes are also very
limited (Lora and Olivera, 2004).
Socioeconomic and macroeconomic variables play an important
role in predicting the level ofownership of¯nancial assets and durable
8 goods, such as electric appliances (Soutar and Cornish-Ward, 1997).
If a consumer perceives an increasing probability of a macroeconomic
crisis or personal ¯nancial distress, he will decrease his demand for
durables and will limit his purchases (Mishkin, 1978). In other words,
the decision of a family to acquire durable goods is not straightfor-
ward: both the ability (that is, having covered basic needs and a rela-
9 tive high income) and stable macroeconomic conditions are needed.
For the purposes of this investigation, the emerging middle class
will be considered as those families that have improved their living
standards, approaching this with the recent acquisition of durable
goods, such as electric appliances. In other words, we de¯ne the
emerging middle class as families who did not have electric appliances
in 2000 but did in 2006. This de¯nition is helpful because it takes
into account four big concerns: ¯rst, it captures the improvement in
welfare of the households involved by the acquisition of durables; sec-
ond, it re°ects that they do not have uncovered needs and that they
do have a relative high income; third, it indicates that the macroe-
conomic variables felt in Mexico were stable; and fourth, it excludes
households that already owned durables and centers on those fami-
lies that, between elections, increased their welfare. Some proclivity
to favor \stability" instead of \change" is expected in this group (so
they can acquire more durable goods), and it is expected that these
preferences should be re°ected in their voting for the PAN's candidate.
A legitimate concern could be: what about households that were
8 T h e o rd er fo r o b ta in in g th ese a p p lia n ces is a lso relev a n t, b ein g a s fo llo w s:
ref ri gerators,washi ng m achi nes,vacuum cl eaners,other appl i ances,other l abor
savi ng devi ces,and ¯nal l y,l uxury goods.
9 Fori nstance,i tcoul d m ean thata parti cul arhousehol d have surpassed the
thi rd and l astpovert y l i nede¯ned by theSoci alD evel opm entSecretary (sevenrm
SED ESO L):the patri m oni all i ne,where the f am i l y has enough i ncom e f or f ood,
dressi ng,educati on,transportati on,and househol d m ai ntenance.¶ 94 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
rich and that now have fallen down to middle class? First, it is impor-
tant to recall that Mexico has not had an economic crisis since mid
and late 90s, which precludes massive falling of welfare standards.
Second, even though some families probably had this misfortune, it
could be assumed that this group of middle class voters would pre-
fer \change" instead of \stability". That is, the economic model
proposed by the incumbent party and its new presidential candidate
(PAN) has not helped them. This situation is properly captured by
the models proposed.
3. T he D ata Set
According to the scope of the proposed analysis, some speci¯c infor-
mation is required. The ideal database would be a panel of the Mex-
ican families that would allow us to track the evolution of their eco-
nomic and sociodemographic characteristics between 2000 and 2006,
including their participation and voting preferences in the 2006 Mexi-
can political process. Speci¯cally, it would be useful to know whether
or not a family acquired any electrical appliances or other durable
goods in the referred period, or even if they lost some of these; in
addition to the usual identi¯cation variables such as household in-
come level, their participation in any governmental social programs,
and where they live. With this, inference of their welfare dynamics
and its correlation with the families' voting choices could be directly
calculated.
Unfortunately, there are some technical limitations to the data
a v a i l a b l ef o rt h er e s e a r c h . T h e¯ r s to n ei st h a tv o t i n gi ss e c r e ta n d
it is not mandatory, and no one, not even the electoral authorities,
knows who voted for whom. The most disaggregated, available, and
o±cial information is the results by voting booth {or casilla{ with
the total and absolute votes for each candidate and with the location
of where it was placed. With this, at least, a direct association could
be made between the political preferences reported by casilla and the
families living nearby.
The second limitation is that IN E G I {the federal institution in
charge of gathering and publishing the statistical and geographical
information{ does not manage panel data for its biennial national
household surveys, named ENI GH, N ati onal Incom e - Expendi ture
H ousehol d Survey. Instead, it randomly selects the families every
time. This precludes tracking a particular family's characteristics
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The third limitation is knowledge of the exact geographic loca-
tion of the families surveyed in the ENI GH. Because of security and
con¯dentiality purposes, this information is only available down to
a municipality level. So, there could not be a direct match between
these families' characteristics and the casilla results reported by the
IF E ; unless, aggregated municipal electoral results and aggregated mu-
nicipal characteristics were used.
Consequently, the data employed in this study, merging the data
available from the IF E and IN E G I, had the following characteristics:
di®erent households and family member information between 2000
and 2006, with the information of which municipality they live in,
and the elections results for this same geographical location. Two
possible econometric speci¯cations emerge to test the political pref-
erences: the ¯rst uses the evolution of the characteristics of the mu-
nicipalities (aggregating family changes as reported in the ENI GHsb y
geographical unit and comparing periods); and the second obtains
the probability ofa family having electric appliances in 2000 and pre-
dicts whether a family seen in 2006, with its current characteristics,
could have had these in 2000. Both will be explained in the following
section.
4. Econom etri c Speci ¯cati on
Basically, the main intention is to ¯nd any correlation between the
household's political preferences and their social, economical, and de-
mographic variables that could hint at any preference for stability
(PAN)o rf o rc h a n g e( PRD). Two di®erent methods will be used to
approach the main thesis: one, correlating the municipal's character-
istics with its local presidential election outcome; and two, simulat-
ing an evolution of the households observed in the ENI GH 2006, from
2000 to 2006, using probit speci¯cations, in order to correlate this
simulated change with the outcome of the presidential election in the
municipality where they live.
4.1. M ethod 1: Aggregated M uni ci palCharacteri sti cs
4.1.1. Description
In accordance with its name, the present methodology's main objec-
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particular municipality and the o±cial results ofthe Presidential Elec-
tion of 2006. It is expected that families in a particular municipality
will prefer the PAN's candidate if they experienced an increase in the
possession of durable goods, such as an electric appliance or a house.
This accords with the arguments expressed in the WS Jarticle cited
above, which associate voting for the PAN's candidate with the wish
for more economical stability. In contrast, PRD's candidate should be
preferred in those municipalities where durable acquisitions, or the
housing market, were slower.
First, the political preference variable (the dependent) must re-
°ect both the direction and the magnitude of a relative electoral
achievement of one party over the other. The most straightforward
option was to compute a ratio ofthe votes received by the two parties
that concern this study, excluding the voting results ofother political
10 parties. Mathematically, the votes received by the PRD in each mu-
nicipality were divided by the votes received by the PAN in the same
location. Afterwards, the natural logarithm of the calculated ratio
was obtained, ending with a voting ratio [VR] variable. Note that
this procedure will draw out a distribution around zero (in the case
of a tie: ln(1)=0) and will treat the di®erences in both directions
symmetrically (ln((a/b))=-ln((b/a))), facilitating the interpretation
of the coe±cients in the model. So, positive outcomes represent a
preference for the PRD, and negative ones represent a preference for
the PAN.
Second, an index was needed in order to summarize the total
change in the possession of the electric appliances in each municipal-
ity. While appliances can be considered separately, the interpretation
of the total statistical e®ects would be much more cumbersome than
ofa single e®ect. Accordingly, we computed the percentages ofhouse-
holds, by geographical unit, which had at least one radio, stereo, TV,
VHS, video games console, computer, fan, refrigerator, blender, iron,
11 washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and microwave, for 2000 and
2006. Given that two years were used, two vectors were calculated,
one for each year, showing the percentage of households possessing
these speci¯c appliances, so the di®erence between the two could be
calculated (2006's vector minus 2000's vector): a positive di®erence
should mean higher welfare; and a negative should mean lower wel-
10 W hether thi s f act m ay obscure i m portant deci si ons (e. g. strategi c voti ng),
rem ains a subject for future research.
11 W h ile th e list is n o t ex h a u stiv e (w ith resp ect to th e list in clu d ed a t ENI GH),
it is a lm o st co m p lete a n d rep resen ts th e m o st ex p en siv e a p p lia n ces.DO WALMARTI ANSRULE? 97
fare. Finally, these di®erences were grouped into an index using prin-
cipal components analysis, recognizing di®erent weights for di®erent
appliances (for instance, acquiring a refrigerator is not the same as
acquiring a blender). According to Johnson and Wichern (1998),
the main purpose of the principal component analysis is to explain
the variance-covariance structure of a set of variables through a few
linear combinations of these variables. This permits data reduction
and compound interpretation. The total population variance can be
explained by adding up the Eigen values of each component as pro-
portionofthesumoftheEigenv a luesofa llthecomponen ts(Johnson
and Wichern, 1998). For this speci¯c set of electric appliances, the
¯rst three components capture 63.3% of the total population vari-
ance. The predicted results of the ¯rst three principal components
were added up and used to construct the electric appliances change
index [EACI ]. It is important to note that the three principal com-
ponents can be used as three independent variables. The advantage
of building an index that incorporates the three of them is that it
12 permits simpler interpretation.
Third, the di®erence from 2000 to 2006 of the municipal aver-
13 age per capita real income [¢RI ] was also computed and used in
the model as a control variable. It was included in order to capture
the \income e®ect" in the political preferences. As well, the propor-
tion of households, by municipality, that are currently paying their
house mortgages [H ] was constructed, because their vulnerability to
macroeconomic distress makes us suspect that they would prefer sta-
bility.
Fourth, the percentage of households in the municipalities that
in 2006 participated in each ofthe two °agship social programs ofthe
Mexican Federal Government (ProC am po [PR]a n dO portuni dades
[OP]) was also computed to estimate its political impact. Partici-
pation was considered without consideration of the magnitude of the
transfer. ProC am po has been de¯ned as
...a hybrid [program ]betw een com pensation,w elfare,and adjustm ent,
de¯ ned in the context of a p olitical w indow of opp ortunity to com p ensate the
losers of trade lib eralization, but w ith a de¯nite w elfare tw ist tow ard the rural
poor. . . (Sadoul et,D avi s and Janvry,2001).
O portuni dadesis a Conditional Cash Transfers program linked to
school attendance by children along with regular medical check-ups
12 T his alternative speci¯cation (w ith the three com ponents as independent
variables) w as tested and the results are the sam e qualitatively.
13 In M exi can pesos of2000.¶ 98 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
(Berhman, Parker and Tood, 2005). Because both are nationwide
programs intended to improve the quality of life of the bene¯ciary
families, it is important to separate its in°uence from our main vari-
able (EACI ).
Fifth, two dummies were created: the ¯rst one indicates if the
governor of the state in which the household analyzed is located is a
member ofthe PRD [PRD]; and the second one ifit is a member ofthe
14 PAN [PAN]( PRIgovernors were dropped to avoid multicollinearity ).
The intention is to separate local political inertia from the economic
rationale we wished to discover.
Finally, the model is represented as follows:
VR = ® + ®E A C I+ ® ¢RI + ®H + ®P R + ®O P i 01 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i
+®P R D + ®P A N + "; 6 i 7 ii
where the ® s are the parameters to be estimated, subindex i the
municipalities in the analysis (N = 224 observations in this ¯rst ap-
proach), and " the error term.
Two caveats should be discussed before presenting the results of
this method. First, the ENI GH reports a weight named factor that is
de¯ned as the inverse probability that a household is selected. If it
is used as frequency and each observation's factor is added all up, it
would add up to the total population of Mexico. However, it would
not do so accurately for the total populations of the states, nor of
the municipalities. Nevertheless, because of the absence of a \mu-
nicipal factor", and with the knowledge that some weight should be
employed with the observations reported in the ENIGH, the factor
weights were used for municipal computations anyway. Second, IF E 's
presidential elections database includes every municipality in Mexico
{of which there are around of 2,200{ because it was a federal election;
in contrast, the ENI GH includes between 300 and 500 municipalities,
depending on the year surveyed. This means that there are some vari-
ations between the municipalities sampled, especially for the smaller
ones, in terms ofpopulation. So, in order to compute the evolution of
a municipality, it should appear in the ENI GH 2000 and in the ENI GH
2006. This occurred with 224 municipalities, which will be subject for
this analysis. So, because the ENI GH is not designed to perform anal-
ysis at a municipal level, the validity of our procedure would depend
14 Interestingly, w hen it w as used instead of PRD or PAN,thi svari abl e had no
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upon the absence of any systematic bias. That is, because we could
only compare the municipalities that were in both ENI GHs, those that
did not match may have had a particular political preference towards
PRD or PAN, according with their characteristics. These characteris-
tics could have been part of the eligibility criteria used by the IN E G I
to survey them.
4.1.2. Results
The regression results are presented in table 1, which were obtained
using the General Method of Moments. While this is not the only
possible estimation method, it imposes very few restrictions on the
data, encompasses other methods (like 2SLS), and allows simple cor-
rection of standard econometric problems (Arnold and Crack, 1999).
The average amount of schooling of the head of the households for
each municipality proved to be a good instrumental variable to deal
with the endogeneity of Municipal Per Capita Real Income Change,
b e c a u s ei te x p l a i n st h i si n d e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ea n di ti so r t h o g o n a lt o
the dependent variable of the model. After doing this, the C -statistic
2 t h a tb e h a v e sa saÂ , with one degree of freedom (one endogenous
variable), and with a null hypothesis, which stated that the endoge-
n o u sv a r i a b l eb e h a v e sa si fi tw e r ee x o g e n o u s ,w i t hav a l u eo f1 . 3 6 5 2 .
That is, the endogeneity problem was corrected. The ¯nal results are:
Tabl e 1
A ggregated M unicipalC haracteristics R esults
C oe± cient
(Std. E rr.)
Electric Appliances Change Index -0.1575
(0.4315)
¡ 4 Municipal Per Capita Real Income Change 1.277x10
¡ 4 (1.078x10
Families with House Mortgages -1.4932*
(0.8060)
O portuni dades 1.0774**













N ote: Si gni ¯cant at *10% ,**5% and ***1%
The ¯rst variable [Electric Appliances Change Index] refers to the
central question of this study. Note that, even though its coe±cient
did not achieve statistical signi¯cance, the negative sign suggests a
correlation between the acquisition of electric appliances in the mu-
nicipality and voting for the PAN's candidate, as expected. Acquiring
durable goods requires stability and we suspect that those who bene-
¯ted from stability would want more. However, this method does not
conclusively show this.
In contrast the Municipal Real Income Change's coe±cient shows
a positive sign, suggesting a positive correlation with the PRD's can-
didate; but, like the ¯rst variable, it was not statistically signi¯cant
either. Notwithstanding, it could be conjectured that those munici-
palities that experienced a positive change in real income would de-
mand more change, as assumed and typi¯ed by the PRD.
The sign ofthe coe±cient for the variable offamilies that are cur-
rently paying their house mortgages had a negative sign, statistically
s i g n i ¯ c a n ta t1 0 % . W h a ti tc a p t u r e si st h a tt h em u n i c i p a l i t i e st h a t
had a larger proportion of this type of family preferred the PAN's
candidate over the PRD's; an assumed preference for stability over
change.
The governmental programs O portuni dades and ProCam po were
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from the former highly supported the PRD's, and those from the lat-
ter supported the PAN's candidate. The result was expected for the
program Oportunidades, because it is intended to help the poorest
Mexicans in the country, and the PRD's campaign was highly oriented
towards them. More surprising was the result of ProC am po,w h i c h
had a negative sign and it was also signi¯cant at 1%. Given its almost
exclusive presence in rural areas, we did not expect it to be correlated
with a preference for the PAN's candidate.
The dummies related to the political a±liation of the state gov-
ernor were, as assumed, highly correlated and statistical signi¯cant
with their respective parties' presidential candidate. That is, having
a PRD governor meant strong support of families in that state for the
15 PRD's presidential candidate; same for a PAN Governor.
4.2. M ethod 2. Probi tpseudo-panel
4.2.1. Description
The section's main intention is to approach the same main hypothesis
but from a di®erent angle. The basic idea is to simulate the existence
of a pseudo-panel (that takes into account the availability of electric
appliances while leaving other things constant) lead by the next aux-
iliary question: would the families observed in the ENI GH of2006 have
had electric appliances under the year 2000's conditions? While the
methodology places some extra burden on the assumptions, it is able
to work with the full sample avoiding some caveats of the previous
16 section.
The identi¯cation strategy consists of two stages. In the ¯rst
stage, a probit auxiliary model computes the probability of a family
seen in the ENI GH 2000 having a speci¯c electric appliances accord-
ing with their characteristics. Afterwards, in the second stage, these
15 A p o ten tia l q u estio n fo r fu tu re resea rch to id en tify w h eth er it is p o litica l
geographical preferences or governors' activism that is correlated w ith voting
preferences.
16 R ecall that m ethod 1 uses tw o E N IG H s and that, b ecause they are not
panel data, the only w ay to com pare them is to use the m unicipal characteris-
tics that change b etw een the tw o surveys; in contrast, m ethod 2 uses household
observati ons,i nstead ofaggregati ng i nf orm ati on at the m uni ci pall evel ,and uses
the E N IG H 2006 to m ake its ¯nal regression, using the E N IG H 2000 only as an
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probabilities are used to predict whether a family seen in the ENI GH
2006, according to their current characteristics, would have had ap-
pliances in 2000; creating a pseudo-panel. By doing so, there is a
special recognition that the probabilities of having electric appliances
in 2006 are di®erent than in 2000, leaving other things constant. That
is, because the second stage uses the characteristics seen in 2006, and
not the ones seen in 2000, any possible changes in the pseudo-panel
would be attributed to changes in the availability of appliances, or
di®erent market conditions.
The probit's variables used for the ¯rst stage were: quarterly
17 real income [RI ], a dummy for electric service in the household
[ES], household size [HS ], a dummy for household ownership [HO]
{whether they were paying their house mortgage or whether they al-
ready own it{, and four dummies for each locality size. This last
variable categorizes localities according with its population size. Be-
ing: 1) for those localities with more than 100,000 inhabitants [LS1];
2) for those between 15,000 and 100,000 [LS2]; 3) for those between
2,500 and 15,000 [LS3]; and 4) for those that have less than 2,500
[LS4]. A probit was run for each electric appliance [EA]u s e di n
Method 1 cited above (13 electric appliances).
The probit models for the ¯rst stage were:
jjj j j j j EA = ¯ + ¯R I+ ¯E S+ ¯HS+ ¯HO + ¯L S 1 iii i i 01 2 3 4 5 i
jj j +¯L S 2+ ¯L S 3 ¡ i + À; i 67 i
with the ¯ 's being the parameters to estimate, subscript i the house-
holds in the analysis (N = 10,089 observations in this ¯rst stage),
superscript j the speci¯c electric appliance, and À the error term.
For the second stage, the econometric procedure followed was to
store the ¯ 's and use them to predict possession of each appliance,
using the same variables but with the ENI GH 2006. If the accumu-
lated probability was over 0.5, it is assumed that the appliance was
acquired. With this, two vectors were generated: observed possession
of each electric appliance according to ENI GH 2006 [v1] and the pre-
dicted values [v2] using the probit' results. A third vector for each
appliance was calculated as v3=v1 ¡ v2. The main purpose of this
new vector [v3] is to capture the pseudo-evolution of the availability
of the appliances (aside from evolutions in the characteristics of the
17 In M exi can pesos of2000.DO WALMARTI ANSRULE? 103
households). Finally, an Electric Appliance Change Index was built
18 with principal components similarly to the Method 1 using v3.
Once the second stage was done, an analogous regression is es-
timated as in Method 1. All the variables were the same with the
exception of income, which we used 2006 income, instead of the dif-
ference between income in 2000 and 2006, mainly because we had
no information we could use to predict a pseudo-evolution of income
between 2000 and 2006. So, due to this limitation, household's real
income was used instead of its change. The other important varia-
tion is that now every observation is at the household level and the
regression can be weighted using the expansion factors as they were
supposed to be used: in a nationwide analysis.
Similarly as in Method 1:
VR = ® + ®E A C I+ ®R I+ ®H + ®P R + ®O P i 01 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i
+®P R D + ®P A N + "; 6 i 7 ii
where the ® 's the parameters to estimate, subindex i the house-
h o l d si nt h ea n a l y s i s( N=2 0 , 2 6 2o b s e r v a t i o n si nt h i ss e c o n ds t a g e ) ,
and " the error term.
With this methodology the probability of having any of the elec-
tric appliances (availability) may have evolved and changed during
the last presidential period and this may be correlated with the votes
received by the incumbent party's candidate. A major advantage
of this procedure is that the analysis could be made by family, and
not by municipality, including the full sample. Its basic caveat, as
with any two stage model (with stages estimated separately), is that
possible statistical noise of the ¯rst stage is carried over.
4.2.2. Results
The regression results are presented in table 2, which were obtained
using the General Method of Moments because of the endogeneity
18 A dding up the ¯rst three com p onents. For this sp eci¯c set of electric appli-
ances, the ¯rst three com p onents capture 44.9% of the total p opulation variance
(Johnson and W ichern 1998). A dding extra com p onents w ould increase the ex-
pl ai ned vari ance, but the regressi on resul ts do not change qual i tati vel y. T hree
com p onents w ere chosen to keep the instrum ents used to control endogeneity as
sim ple as possible.¶ 104 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
found in the Per Capita Real Income. The schooling and the age
of the head of the household, and the household's size were used as
instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity because they ex-
plain the independent variable and are orthogonal to the dependent
2 variable of the model. The C -statistic that behaves as a Â ,w i t h
one degree of freedom (one variable endogenous), and with a null
hypothesis that the endogenous variable will behave as if it were ex-
ogenous, had a value of0.4697. That is, the endogeneity problem was
corrected. The ¯nal results are:
Tabl e 2
Pr ob i tPs e udo- Pane lRe s ul t s
C oe± cient
(Std. E rr.)
Electric Appliances Change Index -0.1018**
(0.0100)
¡ 6 Municipal Per Capita Real Income Change 3.62x10 **
¡ 6 (1.38x10
Families with House Mortgages -0.0977*
(0.0383)
O portuni dades 0.2086**
(0.0295)








No t e :Si g ni ¯c a n ta t*2 % a nd* *1 %
With this approach, the central variable of this study [EACI ]
was statistically signi¯cant and it had a negative sign, suggestingDO WALMARTI ANSRULE? 105
a probable correlation between the availability of electric appliances
and voting for the PAN's candidate. In other words, there were exoge-
nous changes to the families' behavior (the changes are assumed in
this investigation to be market conditions) related to the acquisition
of electric appliances that are correlated with households' political
p r e f e r e n c e s .T h ev a r i a b l ei n c o m ei na b s o l u t el e v e l s[ RI ] was also cor-
related with the votingfor PAN,a se l e c t o r a ls u r v e y sc i t e da tt h eb e g i n -
ning ofthis paper suggested. The variable H ,t h o s ef a m i l i e st h a tw e r e
paying their house mortgages, had a negative coe±cient sign which
re°ects the same economic rationale as in Method 1: families with pe-
riodical and long-term payments would play conservative and prefer
stability over change. The governmental programs of O portuni dades
[OP]a n dPr oCamp o [PR] were positive and negative, respectively,
although the latter lost statistical signi¯cance.
The PRD and the PAN dummies, as in the methodology before,
were signi¯cant and they revealed the same: the governor's party
in°uenced in the political preference ofthe families. While the speci¯c
e®ects within these variables are not identi¯ed, it is certain that the
political inertia at the state level plays a major role.
Thus, with this second speci¯cation, the hypothesis that the
availability of electrical appliances and its possession by Mexican
households played a role in the election is not rejected. The e®ect
of this variable isolated from other independent variables is statisti-
cally signi¯cant.
5 .Co nc l us i o ns
The Mexican 2006 Presidential Election results were very tight and,
at the end, the di®erence between the winning candidate (who came
from the incumbent's party: the PAN)a n dt h ePRD's candidate was
about half percentage point. This research questioned to what extent
the increase in availability of durable goods and electrical appliances
could have in°uenced these results. The underlying issue was the re-
lationship between welfare improvements, the actual economic model
of the country, and the popularity of the ruling party. Despite severe
data limitations, an econometric model was proposed and tested with
two di®erent speci¯cations.
The ¯rst approach consisted in comparing the variables at an
aggregated municipal level. The central variable of this study (an
index that measured the evolution of the possession of electric appli-
ances during the last six years) was not statistically signi¯cant; yet it¶ 106 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
showed evidence of some proclivity to vote for the PAN's candidate.
In contrast, a tendency to vote for the PRD's candidate was related
to an increase of the households' average real income at the munic-
ipal level; but it was not statistically signi¯cant either. On the one
hand, the variables in the econometric model that were signi¯cant
and that favored the PAN's candidate were: if a family was paying its
house mortgage, participating in ProC am po, and from a state with
a PAN Governor. On the other hand, the variables that favored the
PRD's candidate were: participation in O portuni dadesand being from
a state with a PRD governor. The basic limitations of the ¯rst speci-
¯cation are the employment of data whose survey was not explicitly
designed for municipal analysis and the lack ofa complete coincidence
of municipalities between samples.
In the second approach, a pseudo-panel was constructed to com-
pare possession ofthe electrical appliances in year 2006 with the pre-
dicted ownership according to parameters of year 2000. The driving
idea was to explore correlations between the increased availability
of durable goods (isolated from income e®ects) and voting behavior.
The variables of this econometric model were very similar to the pre-
vious speci¯cation, with the di®erence that now everything is at the
household level, making it possible to work with the full ENI GH sam-
ple and using the weight factor properly. In this speci¯cation, the
c e n t r a lv a r i a b l eo ft h es t u d y{ t h ei n d e xb u i l tt om e a s u r et h ee v o l u -
tion of the availability of electric appliances during the last six years{
was correlated with a tendency to vote for the candidate from the
incumbent's party (the PAN candidate) and was statistically signi¯-
cant. The main di®erences were: income signi¯cantly correlated with
voting for the PAN (in the past speci¯cation temporal di®erences in
income was employed) and Pr oCamp ois not signi¯cant anymore.
This paper began with the question ofwhether the increased con-
sumption ofdurable goods {associated in the media with an emerging
middle class{ could have aided the incumbent party to retain the Mex-
ican presidency in 2006, with the victory of the PAN associated in the
media with voter support for PAN's economic model. Important data
limitations forced us to employ indirect tests and rely on correlations
rather than causalities, with the associated identi¯cation problems.
Nonetheless, the analysis was not able to reject the hypothesis that
an increased in consumption of these goods was correlated with vot-
ing for the election winner. In a tight election, a small e®ect could
make the di®erence, and this paper suggests this probably happened.DO WALMARTI ANSRULE? 107
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